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THE TERMINATION OF NONCONFORMING
USES
MARVIN M. MOORE*
A major problem confronting city planners and zoning authorities
today is that posed by nonconforming uses.' Such uses reduce the
effectiveness of-zoning ordinances, depress property values, and directly
contribute to urban blight. They are "an admitted cause of residential
and commercial slums, traffic congestion, and other indicia of urban
obsolescence... o_ The purpose of this article is to examine and evaluate
the various measures that have been devised for terminating the non-
conforming use.
The early zoning laws were, for three reasons, strictly prospective
in operation: First, a municipality's zoning powers are limited by the
state enabling act authorizing the zoning,3 and in a number of jurisdic-
tions the enabling act expressly prohibited the abatement of uses existing
on the effective date of the zoning ordinance. Secondly, in those
jurisdictions lacking such an express prohibition it was feared that the
courts-traditionally hostile to retroactive laws-would view any attempt
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1. A nonconforming use may be defined as a use of property in existence on the
effective date of a zoning ordinance, which use does not comply with the ordinance.
Young, The Regulation and Removal of Nonconforming Uses, 12 V. RES. L. REv.
685 (1961).
2. Norton, Elimination of Incompatible Uses and Structures, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 305 (1955).
3. "The basis for zoning rests ultimately in the exercise of the police power, but the
cities derive their zoning powers from the state enabling acts... " Id. at 354.
4. Although this prohibition is less common than it used to be, as of 1959 the enabling
acts of nearly half the states forbade all or certain municipal corporations from
abruptly terminating uses in existence on the effective date of a zoning ordinance.
Anderson, The Nonconforming Use-A Product of Euclidian Zoning, 10 SYPAcuse L.
Rv. 215 (1959).
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to eliminate existing uses as an abuse of the police power. At first even
prospective zoning rested on a tenuous constitutional basis, and there
was reason to fear that the addition of a retrospective effect might cause
the whole structure of zoning to crumble under the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause.' In 1926 the case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company6 settled doubts concerning the constitutionality of prospec-
tive zoning, but most authorities continued to assume, as before, that
the owner's interest in an existing use was in the nature of a "vested
right", which could not be constitutionally impaired without the pay-
ment of compensation. Subsequent developments have shown that this
assumption was not groundless, for in most of the instances where zoning
ordinances have provided for the immediate cessation of existing uses
the ordinances have, when tested, been held unconstitutional.8
Thirdly, it was originally believed that a well-ordered community
could be achieved without resorting to retroactive measures. "Zoning,"
it was said, "looks to the future and seeks to stabilize and protect, not
to destroy."" It was thought that a zoned area could endure its non-
conforming uses for a few years without suffering any material disrup-
tion of orderly development and that such uses could be expected to
gradually dwindle and disappear if the municipality employed certain
nonretroactive measures. These measures-which are still extensively
used-consisted of restrictions on: change of use, expansion, alteration,
resumption following abandonment, and restoration following destruc-
tion.
Zoning ordinances would commonly forbid a property owner to
substitute one nonconforming use for another.1" Sometimes an excep-
tion would be made to permit a change to a use more restrictive in
nature. However, the exception was usually conditioned on there being
no structural alteration.
The owner of the building housing the nonconforming use was
typically prohibited from expanding the structure or from making al-
terations except for specified purposes or to a specified extent."
5. Comment, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 323 (1962).
6. 272 US. 365 (1926).
7. Id. at 326.
8. Note, 44 CORNELL L. Q. 453 (1959). Such ordinances have been rare.
9. id. at 452.
10. Young, supra note 1, at 692.
11. Van Ausdall, Regulation of Nonconformning Uses in Arkansas: Limitation and
Termination, 16 ARK. L. REv. 275 (1962). Sometimes a nonconforming use exists in a
conforming structure. In this situation the ordinance would normally allow structural
alterations of a kind that did not render the building nonconforming.
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Frequently alteration would be permitted only for safety purposes. On
other occasions the ordinance would impose a percentage-limit on the
amount of alteration allowable.'12 For example, the aggregate expenditure
permitted for alterations would be limited to thirty percent of the build-
ing's assescd va uc. The right to repair, as opposed to the right to
alter, was normally not restricted, since it was generally assumed that
the right to continue the operation of a nonconforming use included
the right to make repairs.13
Ordinances often provided that when a nonconforming use was
abandoned or discontinued for a given period it could not be resumed. 14
Similarly, if the building in which the use was operated were destroyed-
either intentionally or accidentally-it could not be rebuilt. 5
Since only those uses actually in existence on the effective date of
the ordinance could qualify as nonconforming uses and thereby obtain
the right to continue operation, some municipalities were able to impose
an additional restriction on unwanted property uses by being punctilious
in determining when a use antedated the ordinance, or in deciding what
activities on the property were sufficiently well-established to classify
as a "use". These municipalities obtained judicial holdings that one who
at the time of the ban already has a building permit but has not yet
begun construction or signed a contract with a builder does not qualify
as the owner of a nonconforming use;', and that pre-existing activities
of an essentially ephemeral character, such as the operation of a fair or
carnival, are insufficiently permanent to be deemed a "use." 17
Finally, a number of jurisdictions authorized acquisition of the non-
conforming property by eminent domain. The enabling acts of a few
states still expressly provide for this device.'8 However, eminent domain
has never been successfully employed to eliminate nonconforming uses.19
There are two reasons for this: First, use of the eminent domain power
is limited by the requirement that the taking be for a public use, and for
a long time there was doubt as to whether condemnation of a noncon-
forming use merely to effectuate the community's zoning program
12. Anderson, supra note 4, at 228.
13. Id. at 230.
14. Comment, 1951 Vis. L. REv. 687.
15. Comment, 4 VILL. L. REv. 422 (1959).
16. Osborn v. Town of Darien, 119 Conn. 182, 175 AtI. 578 (1934) and Call Bond and
Mortgage Company v. Sioux City, 219 Iowa 572, 259 N.,V. 33 (1935).
17. Durning v. Summerfield, 314 Ky. 318, 235 S.W2d 761 (1951).
18. See Comment, supra note 14, at 696.
19. Ibid.
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complies with the "public use" standard. Today it is clear that barring
an atypically restrictive enabling act, employment of eminent domain
for such a purpose meets the "public use" test. ° Secondly, as a device
for abating the nonconforming use, eminent domain is simply too ex-
pensive." Occasionally, the termination of a particularly objectionable
nonconforming use justifies the cost, just as circumstances in a few
localities justify the expense of piping in and desalinizing sea water,
but municipalities cannot afford to employ eminent domain on an
extensive scale. For this reason the merits of this approach so often
cited by writers-that it has the advantage of swiftness and that it
imposes the cost on the community which will enjoy its benefits rather
than on the nonconforming property owner, whose use of his property
was originally innocent-are of no moment.
Notwithstanding the optimism of those who devised and adopted the
above-discussed measures, experience has shown that nonconforming
uses have no tendency to perish.22 "Like the phoenix, nonconforming
uses seem to rise from the dust of battle stronger than ever." 23 So far
from dying, they commonly flourish more than formerly, because of
the monopoly given them by the zoning laws.
Having gradually come to realize the inadequacy of the measures
just discussed, municipalities in some jurisdictions have recently begun
employing two other devices that seem more promising: amortization
of nonconforming uses and a cautious expansion of the doctrine of
nuisance.
Under the amortization approach the property owner is given a
period of grace sufficiently long to permit him to amortize his invest-
ment. At the end of the alloted time the nonconforming use must be
discontinued. 24 For substantial buildings of brick and steel the time limit
typically ranges from twenty to one hundred years.2" Less expensive
structures, such as billboards, are normally given a much shorter time,
commonly from six months to three years.20 Although some property
usually remains after the amortization period has passed, the owner
20. Anderson, supra note 4, at 239.
21. Note, supra note 8, at 453.
22. Comment, supra note 5, at 323.
23. Comment, supra note 15, at 423.
24. Comment, 10 SYacUsE L. REv. 44 (1958). A common variation on this approach
is to calculate the remaining normal life of the pre-existing use and to limit the use
to this period. Note, supra note 7, at 453.
25. Comment, supra note 14, at 691.
26. Ibid.
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cannot ascribe this property to the time antedating the zoning ordinance,
and he is thus prevented from effectively arguing that the ordinance
is retroactive in operation.17 Amortization actually amounts to a com-
promise between summary abatement, which is generally considered
invalid, and the orthodox approaches, which have failed to eliminate
the nonconforming use.
Although there is a conflict of authority on the question of whether
amortization is constitutional, 8 the device has gained a substantial
measure of judicial acceptance and appears likely to gain more in the
future. One writer predicts that this approach will shortly become
"the most widely adopted solution to the problem 'of nonconforming
uses." 29 The cases sustaining the validity of amortization have stressed
two major points: First, the ordinance is constitutional only if the
amortization period bears a reasonable relation to the amount of the
property owner's investment. And secondly, an ordinance which does
allow a reasonable time for amortization does not differ fundamentally
from a zoning ordinance of the conventional type. That is, since all
zoning has a retrospective aspect in that it applies to property already
owned at the time of the ordinance's effective date, the difference be-
tween an ordinance restricting future uses and one requiring the eventual
termination of present uses is merely one of degree.
Two well-known cases in which the first point was emphasized are
Harbison v. City of Buffalo30 and Spurgeon v. Board of Commissioners
of Shavnzee County.31 The Harbison controversy arose when the City
of Buffalo passed a zoning ordinance requiring termination of certain
nonconforming uses within three years of its effective date. After the
three years had expired Harbison, who owned a junkyard, applied to
the city for renewal of his license. The application was denied, and
Harbison thereupon brought a proceeding in the nature of a mandamus
to compel the city to issue a license to him. The Special Term
ordered issuance of the license, and the Appellate Division affirmed,
but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the matter for a
determination of whether the injury to Harbison would be so substan-
tial that the ordinance would be unconstitutional as applied to the
facts of his particular case. Said the court:
27. See Comment, supra note 15, at 417.
28. Anderson, supra note 4, at 237.
29. Comment, supra note 15, at 417.
30. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42 (1958).
31. 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957).
19651]
6 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEV [Vol. 6:1
If . . . a zoning ordinance provides a sufficient period of permitted
nonconformity, it may further provide that at the end of such period
the use must cease... When the termination provisions are reasonable
in the light of the nature of the business of the property owner, the
improvements erected on the land, the character of the neighborhood,
and the detriment caused the property owner, we may not hold them
constitutionally invalid 32
In the Spurgeon case the owners of an automobile wrecking business
challenged the constitutionality of a zoning resolution placing their
property in a residential district and requiring that their business be
discontinued within two years from the effective date of the resolution.
The Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed a judgment sustaining the
validity of the resolution, saying:
The district court found that two years is a reasonable length of time
within which to require a discontinuance of the prohibited uses . . .
considering the nature of the use and the appellant's investment in im-
provements devoted to those uses . . . We may not substitute our
judgment for that of the county on the two year period of limitation
unless we find facts which demonstrate that the county departed from
the realm of the reasonable and passed over into the realm of the
arbitrary and capricious. 33
Two cases which emphasize the second point (that amortization
does not differ essentially from the orthodox zoning measures) are
Grant v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore34 and City of Los Angeles
v. Gage.-" The former case was an injunction action to restrain the
municipal authorities -from enforcing a zoning ordinance requiring the
removal of billboards from residential areas within a five-year tolerance
period. Rejecting an argument that the effect of the ordinance was
to deprive plaintiffs of property without due process of law, the Mary-
land Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment upholding the enactment.
Said Judge Hammond:
The distinction between an ordinance that restricts future uses and
one that requires existing uses to stop after a reasonable time is not a
difference in kind but one of degree, and in each case constitutionality
32. 4 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 152 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1958).
33. 181 Kan. 1008. 1116, 317 P.2d 798, 806 (1957).
34. 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
35. 127 Cal. App.2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
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depends on overall reasonableness, on the importance of the public
gain in relation to the private loss... Every zoning regulation, because
it affects property already owned by individuals at the time of its
enactment, effects some curtailment of 'vested rights'...: 6
In the Gage case the city sued to enjoin defendants from using their
property for the conduct of a plumbing business in violation of the
zoning provisions of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. These provisions
commanded the discontinuance of certain nonconforming uses within a
five-year period. The California District Court of Appeals, Second
District, sustained the zoning provisions as a valid exercise of the police
power, saying:
Zoning as it affects every piece of property is to some extent retroac-
tive in that it applies to property already owned at the time of the
effective date of the ordinance. The elimination of existing uses within
a reasonable time does not amount to a 'taking' of property . . . Use
of a reasonable amortization scheme provides an equitable means of
reconciliation of the conflicting interests in satisfaction of due process
requirements. 37
As indicated earlier, a few courts have ruled thit amortization is
unconstitutional. As one would suppose, the ground upon which they
have usually relied is that the device constitutes an exploitation of the
police power and involves a taking of property without due process of
law.3s Two illustrative cases are City of Akron v. Chapman9 and City
of Corpus Christi v. Allen.40
The Chapman controversy was an injunction suit brought by the city
to enforce compliance with a zoning ordinance. In 1922 the City of
Akron passed a comprehensive zoning act which placed defendant's
property in a residential district and which provided that a nonconform-
ing use must cease when the city council decided that the use had been
permitted to continue for a reasonable time. In January of 1950 the
city passed another ordinance, declaring that on January 1, 1951, the
defendant's nonconforming use of his property would have existed for
a reasonable time and would henceforth have to conform to the zoning
classification. When defendant continued to use his property for junk-
36. 212 Md. 301, 308, 129 A.2d 363, 370 (1957).
37. 127 Cal. App.2d 442, 452, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (1954).
38. See Note 67 HARV. L. REv. 1283 (1954).
39. 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E2d 697 (1953).
40. 152 Tex. 137, 254 SAV.2d 759 (1953).
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yard purposes after January 1, 1951, the city sued to compel compliance.
Reversing the judgment of the trial court, the Court of Appeals en-
joined defendant from using the property for the operation of a junk
business and ordered him to remove his materials from the premises
within sixty days. But the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the decision
of the Court of Appeals and denied the injunction. Stated Judge
Lamnick:
Injunctions are asked . . . to uphold the provision of a municipal
ordinance which in effect denies the owner of property the right to
continue to conduct a lawful business thereon, which use was in
existence at the time of the passage of the ordinance and has continued
without expansion or interruption ever since . . . The right to con-
tinue to use one's property in a lawful business and in a manner which
does not constitute a nuisance and which was lawful at the time it
was acquired it within the protection of Sect. 1, Art. XIV, Amend-
ments, Constitution of the United States and Sect. 16, Art. I of the
Ohio Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived
of . . . property without due process of law.41
Although the court did not so indicate, its unsympathetic attitude
toward the two ordinances may well have been produced by the fact
that the "reasonable time" limitation of the 1922 ordinance was obvious-
ly too uncertain a standard to apprise Chapman of what to expect, and
the "one year" limitation of the 1951 ordinance was too short to be
fair.
In the Allen case the city brought suit against the operators of two
automobile wrecking yards to restrain them from continuing their
businesses in violation of an amendment to a municipal zoning ordinance.
The relevant section of the enactment required automobile wrecking
yards, among other businesses, to conform within one and one-half
years of the amendment's effective date. The Supreme Court of Texas
affirmed a judgment that application of the ordinance to existing auto-
mobile wrecking establishments was unconstitutional. Declared Justice
Brewster:
Since the nonconforming uses here sought to be enjoined are not
shown to constitute nuisances, and do not appear to be harmful in
any way to public health, safety, morals, or welfare, we conclude
that to invoke petitioner's ordinance to compel respondents to cease
operating their businesses or to move them to another district would be
41. 160 Ohio St. 382, 387, 116 N.F.2d 697, 700 (1953).
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an unreasonable exercise of petitioner's police power and would con-
stitute a taking of property in violation of Art. 1, Sect. 17 of the
Constitution of Texas (due process clause) 42
The court did not ground its decision on the inadequacy of the
amortization period, but one wonders whether the result might not
have been different had the period of grace been longer.
The amortization device is considered by many to be the fairest
method of reconciling the individual property owner's interest, in the
free use of his property, with that of the public in a pleasant, well-
ordered community. 43 This approach does not deprive the property
owner of the use of his property immediately upon the passage of the
zoning ordinance, but neither does it allow the nonconforming use to
perpetually constitute a blemish on the area in which it is located. The
period of tolerance allows the property owner to retire his original
investment with profits enhanced by the monopolistic position granted
him by the zoning ordinance, and any loss that he does suffer is
cushioned by being spread out over a period of years. In addition, the
grace period gives him time to make new plans for the future. It is for
these reasons that amortization represents the most promising weapon
for combating the nonconforming use.
Another device that has recently been adopted in a few jurisdictions
is that of expanding the doctrine of nuisance sufficiently to encompass
those nonconforming uses of an especially offensive character.44 The
law of nuisance has traditionally been available to an injured property
owner only where the objectionable use constituted a clear hazard to
the plaintiff's (or the public's) health, safety, or morals or caused a
substantial interference with his peace or comfort.4 5 This standard has
normally restricted injunctive relief to those instances where the use has
produced effects of a tangible, crude, and exceedingly "distasteful
nature.46 Quoting PROSSER's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs:
But where it (the invasion) involves mere personal discomfort or
annoyance, some other standard must obviously be adopted than the
personal tastes, susceptibilities, and idiosyncracies of the particular
plaintiff. The standard must necessarily be that of definite offensive-
ness, inconvenience, or annoyance to the normal person in the com-
42. 152 Tex. 137, 139, 254 S.W.2d 759, 761 (1953).
43. See Anderson, supra note 4, at 238.
44. See Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1103 (1955).
45. 39 AM. JUR. Nuisances §§ 8, 9 (1942).
46. Norton, supra note 2, at 312.
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munity. . .47 Each defendant is privileged, within reasonable limits, to
make use of his own property or to conduct his own affairs at the
expense of some harm to his neighbors . . . It is only when his con-
duct is unreasonable, in the light of its utility and the harm which
results, that it becomes a nuisance. 48
Since most nonconforming uses do not produce effects of such a dis-
tinctly offensive character, an orthodox application of the law of
nuisance usually will not aid persons wishing to rid an area of such a
use. However, by stressing the "general welfare" aspect of the police
power, rather than the "health, safety, or morals" aspect upon which
the doctrine of nuisance was based,49 Some courts have recently been
able to sanction the abatement of land uses having merely impalpable
harmful effects on the surrounding area. Two illustrative cases are
Livingston Rock and Gravel Company v. County of Los Angeles,"'
and Hav-a-Tampa Cigar Company v. Johnson.-" The Livingston case
was an injunction action by a cement batching company to restrain the
county from enforcing zoning provisions permitting the regional plan-
ning commission to order the termination of plaintiff's operations. The
provisions in question, which were passed shortly after plaintiff had be-
gun its business, authorized the abatement of an existing use where it
was "so exercised as to be detrimental to the public health or safety
or so as to be a nuisance." The Supreme Court of California reversed
the decision of the trial court, which had granted plaintiff an injunction,
and sustained the action of the planning commission, which had found
plaintiff's business to be a nuisance and had ordered its cessation within
two years. Stated Justice Spence:
Implicit in the theory of the police power . . . is the principle that
incidental injury to an individual will not prevent its operation, once
it is shown to be exercised for proper purposes of public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare, and there is no arbitrary and
unreasonable application in the particular case . . . Although plaintiffs
admittedly did comply with smog and air pollution regulatory re-
quirements, their plant might be still so operated 'as to be detrimental
to the public health or safety, or as to be a nuisance'. 52
47. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE: LAW OF TORTS 396 (1955).
48. Id. at 398.
49. Comment, supra note 5, at 325.
50. 43 Cal.2d 184, 272 P.2d 4 (1954).
51. 149 Fla. 1408, 5 So.2d 433 (1951).
52. 43 Cal.2d 184, 190, 272 P.2d 4, 10 (1954).
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In the Johnson case the Hay-a-Tampa Cigar Company sued to
enjoin the Chairman of the Florida State Road Department from en-
forcing provisions of a statute disallowing advertising signs within fifteen
feet of the edge of a public highway or within one hundred feet of a
public park, public playground, or state forest.53 Ruling that the enact-
ment was a constitutional exercise of the state's police power, the court
declared:
Nuisances caused by the possession or use of property may be abated...
without violating organic property rights, when that remedy is neces-
sary to protect the public welfare... The statute in this case is ap-
propriate to accomplish a general public purpose and is not shown to
be an arbitrary or unnecessary exercise of the police power of the
state. . .54 Relief of the eye from irritating color, movement, and
motif should be as justified before the law as removing disagreeable
odors from the nose or disagreeable noises from the ear.55
As our understanding of nuisance-causing factors in urban areas in-
creases, through sociological, medical, psychological, and economic re-
search,516 employment of a judiciously-expanded doctrine of nuisance
may enable municipalities to eliminate numerous nonconforming uses
of an especially objectionable character. It would seem advisable, how-
ever, that this approach be pursued very cautiously, since any attempt
to use the device to reach all nonconforming uses would doubtlessly
encounter stiff judicial resistance and elicit outcries of "confiscation"
from critical observers. Moreover, considerations of fairness surely
dictate that any doctrine which subjects a property owner to the
economic and psychological hardship of immediately closing or moving
his business be used with restraint.
In conclusion, it is hoped that states and municipalities will increasingly
utilize the devices of amortization and an expanded doctrine of nuisance
to cope with the problem presented by nonconforming uses. The most
progressive and well-drafted zoning ordinances are no more effective
than their provisions concerning such uses.
53. This statute applied to signs already in place, as well as to those to be erected
in the future. The signs already in use may be analogized to nonconforming uses even
though the statute in question was nor a zoning ordinance.
54. 149 Fla. 1408, 1412, 5 So.2d 433, 437 (1951).
55. 149 Fla. 1408, 1414, 5 So.2d 433, 439 (1951). This is from the concurring opinion
of Chief Justice Brown.
56. See Norton, supra note 2, at 312.
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